Why ZOG Hates Encryption
In a day and age when the politically incorrect writings or your irreverent webpage files you have stored on your computer, or even books on your shelf, can all be used against you to impugn and destroy your character a court of law by tainting the jury pool against you, it behooves you to take steps to keep your files, e-mails, writings, internal memos and affects secured. Encryption is the best and cheapest way to do just that.
There are some misconceptions in certain WN circles about the strength and use of encryption products and how they relate to WN groups, so I’m going to try my best to clear those up right now. My belief is that encryption can and will keep your files secure with minimal downsides when used properly and consistently, and ultimately encryption keeps you secure enough to prevent ZOG from digging up dirt to use against you.
The fact of the matter is that, for all practical purposes, commonly-available strong military-grade encryption products are secure enough that major world governments cannot decode them in a reasonable amount of time. Therefore any and all WN’s can and should use encrypted communications products frequently for their internal communications. There’s no good reason to not use them; operating in a “transparent” mode and method does not prove you are law-abiding; it only makes it easier for ZOG and the enemies of our people to root around looking for something to drum up charges against you and shut you up.
Encryption also gives ZOG spy programs like Echelon (http://www.echelonwatch.org/) and Carnivore (http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/ or http://computer.howstuffworks.com/carnivore.htm) a big headache, and may help keep you out of those snoopy spy dossier databases like the controversial and still-functioning Total Information Awareness database (http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/ or http://www.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/). The former programs spy on all of your internet, telephone, e-mail and fax traffic looking for whatever ZOG considers to be “criminal” that particular minute. While you are not doing anything illegal, ZOG assumes that you are from the outset and ZOG, not you, determines whether your actions are legal or not. Thus, encryption keeps you under the radar of these ZOG snoops and may even keep you out of jail by preventing them from railroading you on a technicality.
Your choice is clear: You will either protect your privacy, as is your right, and you will be able to do your duty to your race longer and stronger than the other guy. Or you will be transparent, the prosecutor will use your impolite thoughts and feelings to make you out to be Satan incarnate, and you will rot in prison for long years as the prosecution makes ad hominem attacks the center of the case rather than the facts. (Think George Loeb or Randy Weaver [http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/gangsters_outlaws/cops_others/randy_weaver/1.html], the latter of which enjoyed his prosecution spending “several days going over the Weavers’ religious views, trying to establish that they were racist and had a long-lived conspiracy to violently confront the government,” irrespective of the facts of the case.) The situation is a bit different if you are a frontman or a leader for a WN group, but even there you will need to keep your “inner party” messages secured and private.
Having covered that, lets start with the basic math concepts related to encryption. This might get technical, so hold on to your hat.
Most encryption algorithms used these days in secured communications products are a minimum 128-bit, meaning that they encrypt in 128-bit “words” or blocks of information. (The first exception that comes to mind is digital cellular telephones, which have a very weak 56-bit optional encryption under the GSM 5.3 standard. This encryption is so weak it can be broken in a matter of hours on a regular desktop PC, and purpose-built machines are sold on the market right now that allow major governments, businesses and organized crime syndicates or triads to listen in onto your conversation and/or steal your cell-phone UIN. That’s another matter, however.)
A 128-bit key (2128) means it was produced out of 3.40 x 1038 different possible key combinations. In order to decrypt, say, a PGP message encoded with a 128-bit key, a brute force attack will be necessary since good encryption algorithms will be resistant to different attack methods, and thus the message itself must be attacked. For a brute-force attack, going through every singe possible key, an attacker has a 50% probability of success by testing half of all possible keys, thus we will assume 1.701x 1038 (2127) different keys to test.
Let’s suppose you have a trillion computers (1 x 1012) that can each test a trillion keys per second (1 x 1012) for a total computational capacity of 1 x 1024 keys per second.
1.701 x 1038 keys
÷ 1.000 x 1024 keys/second
170,141,183,460,469.2 seconds to test half of all keys for our hypothetical PGP message.
That’s a lot of time! Let’s convert it to years.
÷ 3,600.0 seconds/hour
÷ 24.00 hours/day
÷ 365.25 days/year (Including leap years)
5.4 million years with a fleet of a trillion supercomputers just to decrypt 50% of a single PGP-encoded message. Anybody want to bet that ZOG has that kind of time and computing power on it’s hands?
This is just for a brute force attack, however. There are many methods of cryptanalysis available to cryptographers and governmental intelligence agencies (linear and differential cryptanalysis are two that come to mind) which can significantly shave off the amount of time necessary to decode an armored message. However, even these approaches will take anywhere between thousands and billions of years.
Instead of taking my word for it, let’s consult some independent sources on the subject, regarding how easy or difficult breaking codes can be:
Simon Singh, author of The Code Book, a history of codes, said: “Modern codes are effectively unbreakable, very cheap and widely available. I could send an email today and all the world’s secret services using all the computers in the world would not be able to break it. The code maker definitely has a huge advantage over the codebreaker.”
The reason for this is that an encoded text is so complex that it can resist all efforts to break it.
“If all the personal computers in the world—260 million—were put to work on a single PGP-encrypted message, it would still take an estimated 12 million times the age of the universe, on average, to break a single message.”
—William Crowell, Deputy Director, National Security Agency, in Senate testimony on March 20, 1997
If the NSA is whining about encryption, this tells you something about how much they are on the short end of the stick regarding the widespread distribution of this kind of technology. ZOG wants to play with all cards in its hands and it makes ZOG piss its pants to imagine that it cannot snoop, search and seize when and where it wants at a whim, to hell with your “rights.” When the power is there, they’ll search first as a black-bag operation and make up some flimsy rationale after the fact. Encryption stops them fast in their tracks, and it can also save you from a lengthy prison sentence on a trumped up conspiracy charge, provided you implement it properly.
The key to preventing your messages from being compromised this is threefold:
- Ensure you are using an encryption algorithm that has been peer reviewed and repeatedly tested against attack. This is the easy part because all proposed encryption algorithms are tested against all kinds of attack methods and weak encryption schemes are either improved to the point where they are secure or they are dropped from distribution in final products. No business distributing crypto products wants to be sued when a customer’s proposed product research ideas are stolen by a competitor before they can be patented.
- Ensure that the software you are using for encryption purposes is open source and/or peer reviewed. Good cryptographic algorithms can be poorly implemented by the programmers, thus resulting in unintentional back-doors which can be exploited by hackers and ZOG spooks. This is minimized when the software code has been openly reviewed by security experts.
- Ensure your system is not compromised. This is the hardest part of the equation. It requires that you have good virus scanners and ensure that unauthorized access to your computer is eliminated with password logons, activity logs for guests, and your computer’s most delicate files (webpage files, member lists, etc.) are encrypted 100% of the time. Frequent scans of your system’s active processes and program registry may be in order. You want your computer secured enough to prevent someone from dropping a key-logger or Magic Lantern (http://www.cotse.net/privacy/magic_lantern.htm or http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/12/03/fbi_magic_lantern_reality_check/) onto your system.
PGP http://www.pgp.com or http://www.pgpi.org is probably the most convenient security suites available, but while available for M$ Windoze and Macintosh it unfortunately does not come with a Linux distribution (yet). PGP is open source, it has been peer reviewed extensively, it has a nice collection of tried and tested algorithms and the full version has a handy feature called PGP Disk. PGP Disk allows you to create an encrypted virtual hard disk on you physical hard drive, which keeps your most sensitive files and programs secure even if your computer is seized.
This virtual HD has the handy feature of being easy to back up on a regular interval provided you size the partition correctly to fit on a CD-RW or DVD±RW. These backups should then be stored securely someplace where they will not be readily found even during an exhaustive search of your office or residence.
There are other encryption products you should consider as well for other purposes. DriveCrypt encrypts your entire hard drive (including your operating system), requiring a passphrase and optionally a hardware key to boot up; without it, no access to any files on the hard drive itself is possible, even if the hard drive it removed and copied. Trillian or Gaim have the option to encrypt your Instant Messages over popular chat protocols like Yahoo! and AOL, while SST offers encrypted protection for voice chats, chat rooms, voice messages, and file transfers.
In closing, your freedoms and privacies will remain yours to exercise only if you take active steps to defend them. Your ability to lead and wage resistance against the blood enemies of the White Race in the future will depend on how long you survive without legal hassles; this is the cost of doing business for WN’s these days, and you do more good out and about than dead at ZOG’s hands or sitting in a ZOG gulag. Encryption is just one of many tools you can use to save your neck and help bring about a Whiter new world.
Recommended for further reading and research :
Basic legality of encryption here:
Introduction to Cryptography here:
General Q&A on encryption here:
Encrypted Instant Messaging [IM] programs like Trillian (http://www.trillian.cc) or Gaim (http://gaim.sourceforge.net/downloads.php with the encryption module here: http://sourceforge.net/projects/gaim-encryption/) keep your instant messages secure and free from both eavesdroppers and Carnivore or Eschelon. Trillian must be paid for and Gaim is open-source freeware. SST (http://www.secureshuttle.com) is another Windoze-only IM client which doesn’t have the bells and whistles of Gaim or Trillian, but instead offers latent messages, encrypted conference chats, encrypted voice messages and voice chats, encrypted file transfers and a few other things as well. Where the other IM products leave off as far as security is concerned, SST picks up.
Encrypted cellular phones, while very expensive currently, keep ZOG and other spies at bay, preventing them from eavesdropping on your conversations illegally, as the LAPD did illegally back in 1998 (http://pd.co.la.ca.us/contempt.htm). They were caught red handed; how many other ZOG entities do the same thing and are never caught?
More here: http://www.usatoday.com/tech/techreviews/2001-06-05-crypto-phone.htm
Encrypted web surfing services like MegaProxy (http://www.megaproxy.com) or Anonymizer (http://www.anonymizer.com) keep your ISP from snooping on your web habits and also cut down on the ability of Carnivore or Echelon to snoop on you for whatever nefarious ZOG purpose they have devised. MegaProxy is probably the better of the two since it is cheaper, can be logged on to from any internet-accessible computer and requires no software installation.
Virtual Hard Drive Encryption is available with the full version of PGP Desktop ($50 http://www.pgp.com) as well as dozens of other products like http://www.cypherix.com/cryptainerle/index.htm?source=google_crypto_sw or . DriveCrypt ($59 http://www.drivecrypt.com/) is unique in that it encrypts your full hard drive 100% of the time, including the system, requiring a passphrase to boot up properly. This product is particularly useful for PC notebook users who must contend with the reality of computer theft. In the event of a theft or seizure of your computer, the hard drive is worthless.
Note: Some people complain that ALL commercial encryption products are worthless because the NSA or other major world governments have either mandated built-in back doors or have the processing power to decode all encrypted messages sent through cyberspace. I consider such viewpoints to be fundamentally naïve, for the simple reason that any kind of backdoor will create a latent security weakness which will compromise not only the entire software program or communications hardware but also the millions of valid, legitimate business transactions that occur each day between businesses and customers. With literally trillions of dollars changing hands each and every day electronically, how long do you think major world businesses and banks could rely on encrypting transactions with a coded weakness built in before some hacker or mafia organization brought the entire system down by embezzling millions or billions of dollars? Not long at all, assuredly; if the government can hack in, eventually an unauthorized 3rd party will as well, which is why back doors are bad for the business of not only selling security products, but also for the legitimate customers that use them. Consider this source: http://www.rossde.com/PGP/pgp_backdoor.html Also consider these technical papers on Key Escrow technology, a standard which was never adopted due to massive security hazards with the proposed model.
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